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Abstract 
This article presents a formal theory about nontrivial reasoning with inconsistent 
information, applicable, among other things, to defeasible reasoning. The theory, which 
is inspired by a formal analysis of legal argument, is based on the idea that inconsistency 
tolerant reasoning is more than revising an unstructural set of premises; rather it should 
be regarded as constructing and comparing  arguments for incompatible conclusions. 
This point of view gives rise to two important observations, both pointing at some flaws 
of other theories. The first is that arguments should be compared as they are constructed, 
viz. step-by-step, while the second observation is that a knowledge representation language 
is needed with a  defeasible conditional, since the material implication gives rise to 
arguments which are not constructed in actual reasoning. Accordingly, a nonmonotonic 
logic, default logic, is chosen as the formalism underlying the argumentation framework. 
The general structure of the framework allows for any standard for comparing pairs of 
arguments; in this study two such standards are investigated, based on specificity and 
on orderings of the premises. 
1  Introduction 
This paper connects two recent developments in formal research on common- 
sense reasoning: the study of argumentation and the study of inconsistency tolerant 
reasoning. The first development concerns the argumentation aspect of common- 
sense reasoning, i.e. the process of constructing and comparing arguments for or 
against  a  certain conclusion. Particularly in the legal field this  development has 
become prevalent, in attempts to model the adversarial aspect of legal reasoning. 
These  attempts  are  based  on the  idea that  lawyers do  not  argue  for the  legally 
correct solution, if it exists at all, but for the solution which best serves the client's 
interests; in doing so a lawyer has available a large body of conflicting opinions, 
rules, precedents, principles and so on, with which to construct a coherent argument; 
of course, the opponent in a law suit will do the same and therefore not only ways 
of constructing arguments but  also  ways of comparing them become important. 
While  in the legal domain this development has mainly resulted in implemented 
programs (e.g.  [2, 6]), in other areas of AI research mainly formal argumentation 
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systems have been developed [9, 22, 23]. These systems are meant to be an alternative 
to  earlier approaches  to  formalize so-called  nonmonotonic reasoning,  in  which 
conclusions can be invalidated by adding new information to the premises. This 
kind of reasoning is motivated by the fact that in real life people do not always have 
sufficient information to make  a  safe  step  towards the conclusion; instead, they 
often jump to conclusions by applying general, defeasible rules, since it is often too 
costly or even impossible to find the information which would guarantee a  safe 
landing. Of course, in unusual circumstances this jump might appear to be unjustified, 
which is the reason why new information can invalidate old conclusions. 
The second development, the study of inconsistency tolerant reasoning, has 
mainly taken place in the study of nonmonotonic reasoning. Usually, formalizations 
of nonmonotonic reasoning start with a consistent set of premises and provide for 
ways of deriving plausible but deductively unsound conclusions from them. However, 
a different approach is allowing the premises to be inconsistent and to prefer some 
part of the premises if indeed an inconsistency occurs (cf.  [3, 13, 14,20]).  In this 
view, defeasible rules express approximations to reality, which might need to be 
corrected in specific circumstances: people reason with defaults as if they were true, 
until they give rise to  an inconsistency. The  attractiveness of this  idea is  that  if 
nonmonotonic reasoning is regarded as a kind of inconsistency handling in classical 
logic, no new logic needs to be developed. For legal applications this approach is 
interesting for yet another reason, since it might result in theories which can also 
be used for modelling the way lawyers reason with hierarchies of regulations. In 
fact the second approach which will be discussed partly originates from legal philosophy. 
The present paper is the result of a logical investigation of reasoning with 
inconsistent and incomplete information in legal reasoning; it has appeared that in 
the legal domain the above sketched developments are closely related, and since the 
law is just one domain of common-sense reasoning, this observation is relevant for 
other areas  as  well. Accordingly, the  aim of the present paper is  to  investigate 
argumentation and inconsistency tolerant reasoning from  a  unifying perspective, 
which is that, unlike standard logic, in which from a contradiction anything can be 
derived, both phenomena deal with inconsistencies in a nontrivial way: in argumentation 
systems conflicting arguments are compared in order to choose the best one, and 
in inconsistency tolerant reasoning inconsistent premises  are revised in order to 
derive nontrivial information. Although it seems very natural to study these phenomena 
in relation to each other, this up to now has been done surprisingly little. Still, such 
a  combination is able to overcome some serious flaws of existing approaches to 
inconsistency tolerant reasoning, caused by the failure to recognize the argumentation 
aspect of this kind of reasoning. The unified study of the two developments will 
also yield a second important result, which is that information which is subject to 
conflict resolution  metaprinciples  is  irreducibly defeasible  in  nature,  for  which 
reason classical knowledge is inadequate even as a knowledge representation language. 
The  structure of this  report  is as  follows.  In section 2  some problems  ol 
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theory is given in section 3 in the form of an argumentation framework based on 
default logic. In section 4 two applications of this framework with different standards 
for comparing arguments are discussed, which in section 5 are illustrated by examples. 
Then section 6 discusses related research and section 7 contains some remarks on 
implementing the theory. 
2.  Existing approaches to inconsistency tolerant reasoning 
In this section three existing approaches to nontrivial reasoning with inconsistent 
information will be discussed, two of which originate from the study of nonmonotonic 
reasoning. Among the researchers modelling nonmonotonic reasoning as inconsistency 
tolerant reasoning are Brewka [3], Poole [13, 14] and Roos [20]; earlier Alchourr6n 
and Makinson [1 ] applied inconsistency handling techniques to hierarchies of legal 
regulations. The general idea goes back to Rescher [19]: if the set of premises turns 
out to be inconsistent, maximal consistent subsets (for which we will use Brewka's 
term "subtheories") are identified and ordered according to some preference relation: 
in applications to nonmonotonic reasoning generally the subtheories containing the 
most specific information are preferred, while in legal applications those subtheories 
are preferred that best obey the legal conflict resolution metaprinciples. The preferred 
subtheories  can  be  used  for  defining  two  nonstandard  consequence  relations, 
corresponding to following from one of the preferred subtheories or from all of them. 
I will investigate three approaches based on this idea: first Poole's framework 
for default reasoning, then belief-revision related approaches inspired by Alchourr6n 
and Makinson, and finally, Brewka's preferred-subtheories approach. The last two 
approaches use orderings on formulas to determine the preferred subtheories, for 
which reason some notational conventions have to be explained: "x < y" stands for 
"y is preferred over x";  "x = y" is  shorthand  for "x < y  and y < x";  and "x < y" 
abbreviates "x _< y and y ~  x". Unless stated otherwise, < is assumed to be a partial 
preorder, i.e. a  relation which is transitive and reflexive. 
2.1.  POOLE'S  THEORY COMPARATOR 
As Brewka [3] has convincingly argued, Poole's framework for default reasoning 
may be regarded as an application of the "preferred subtheories" idea. Poole [13] 
presents a formalization of the so-called specificity principle against the background 
of a general view on default reasoning presented in detail in [14]. Essentially, this 
view is that if defaults are regarded as possible hypotheses with which theories can 
be constructed to explain certain facts, there is no need to change the logic but only 
the way the logic is used. Accordingly, the semantics and proof theory of Poole's 
"logical framework for default reasoning" are simply those of first-order predicate 
logic. The basis of this framework are the sets F  and ~. F  is a set of closed first- 
order formulas, the facts, assumed consistent, and ~ is a set of possibly inconsistent 
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is a consistent set F u  D, where D is a set of ground instances of defaults of 6. An 
explanation of a closed formula is a scenario implying it. Theory formation consists 
in constructing an explanation for a given formula. An extension is a maximal (with 
respect  to  set  inclusion)  scenario.  Extensions  can  be  regarded  as  the  preferred 
subtheories of a  default theory. These definitions tell us that in constructing an 
explanation the facts must be obeyed but that the use of any default is free, as long 
as its use is consistent with the facts and the other applied defaults. 
Conflicting explanations can be compared with respect to any criterion, one 
of which is their specificity. Consider explanations Ai = F u  Di for # and Aj = F u  Dj 
for--,q}.  Informally, the idea is that Ai is more specific than Aj iff there is apossible 
situation in which only Aj applies. To make this precise, the facts F are divided into 
necessary facts Fn, regarded as holding in all possible situations, and contingent 
facts Fc, the "input facts" of a case at hand. What is important is that the contingent 
facts are only used to derive conclusions about the actual circumstances; in determining 
specificity they are replaced by any set of "possible facts", which need  not  even 
be a  subset of Fc. Now Ai is more specific than Aj with respect to q) iff there is 
a possible fact Fp which makes Aj explain --,# without making Ai explain ~or--,~ 
(this last "non-triviality" requirement for Ai and --,~  is essential, since without it 
the possible fact --,# would always make Ai more specific than Aj). These ideas are 
captured in the following definition, which differs from Poole's in some inessential 
respects. 
DEFINITION 2.1 
Let  Ai = (Fn u  Fc u  Di)  and  Aj = (Fn u  Fc u  Dj)  be  explanations  for, 
respectively, ~ and --,q). Then Ai is more specific than Aj with respect to ~ iff there 
is a  fact Fp such that 
￿9  Fn u  {Fp}  U  Dj ~  --,~ 
￿9  Fn w  {Fp} w Di not ~ --,# and not ~ --,~. (~ denotes first-order entailment.) 
If, in addition, Aj is not more specific than Ai with respect to ~, then Ai is strictly 
more specific than Aj with respect to @. 
This elegant definition gives the intuitive results in the standard examples. Consider 
the following two pairs of conflicting explanations. 
EXAMPLE 2.2 
Fcl  =  {a,c} 
AI:  Fcl u  {aDb} 
AI':  Fcl u  {(a ^  c) D--,b} 
Fc2 =  {a}  Fn2 =  {c z  a} 
A2  = Fc2 u  Fn2 u  {  a z  b} 
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In both cases Fp = a is a fact making the first scenarios explain b  without making 
the second ones explain -,b, while all possible facts making the second scenarios 
explain --,b  will  make the first  ones explain b:  in case  of AI' because  all  such 
possible facts imply (c ^  a), which implies a,  and in case of A2' because all such 
facts  imply c,  which together with Fn also implies a:  in result,  AI'  and  A2'  are 
strictly more specific with respect to b than their counterarguments. Consider next 
A3:  Fcl u  {aDb} 
A3':  Fcl u  {c D--,b} 
In this case a is a possible fact making A3 explain b  without making A3' explain 
-,b, and c is a possible fact making A3' explain ~b  without making A3 explain b, 
for  which  reason  both arguments are more specific than each other with respect 
to b  and neither wins the conflict. Applications of Poole's specificity definition to 
legal reasoning are discussed in  [15]. 
However, despite their intuitive attractiveness, Poole's ideas also have some 
drawbacks.  One problem is that definition 2.1  ignores the possibility of multiple 
conflicts, as is  shown by the next example. 
EXAMPLE 2.3 
A3  =Fcw{aDb,  bDc,  cDd} 
A4  =  Fcu  {(a ^  f) D~b,  ~bD  e,  e D--,d} 
Fc  =  {a,f}  Fn={cDe} 
Poole's definition prefers A3 for d, because e is a fact which makes A4 explain ~d 
without A3 explaining d,  while all  facts which make A3  explain d  imply c  and 
therefore, since Fn contains (c D e ), they all imply e, which makes A4 explain --,d 
(note  again  that  Fc  is ignored). However, this ignores the fact that A4 uses the 
fact b, for which the scenario A3' = Fc u  Fn u  {a D b}  is strictly less specific than 
A4' = Fc u  Fn u  {(a ^  f) D ~b}  for ~b. 
Of course, as Poole [13, p. 146] himself recognizes when discussing a similar 
example, for an argument to be preferred not only the final conclusion but also all 
intermediate conclusions must be preferred. The problem with definition 2.1, however, 
is that it does not recognize b  as an intermediate conclusion of A3. To  repair this 
shortcoming (which Poole does not do), the specificity definition should be embedded 
in  a  more  general  theory,  defining when  and  to  which conflicts the  specificity 
comparator should be applied. What is important is that such a framework reflects 
the  step-by-step nature of constructing and comparing arguments: rather than at 
once, it should be checked after each step whether the argument constructed thus 
far is better than all counterarguments, and if at some step there are counterarguments 
which are strictly more specific with respect to the conclusions of that step, the 
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off after its intermediate step leading to "b" and therefore A4 will for trivial reasons 
be the argument which wins the conflict about "d", since its only counterargument, 
which is A3, has not survived a  comparison for an earlier step.  One of the main 
goals of this article will be to formalize this step-by-step nature of constructing and 
comparing arguments. 
A  second  problem  of Poole's  framework,  which it  shares  with the  other 
approaches, will be discussed in the next subsections. 
2.2.  BELIEF  REVISION APPROACHES 
Belief revision (cf. [7]) is about the dynamics of "belief sets": it studies the 
process of revising a set of propositions with respect to a certain proposition. Belief 
revision can be applied to several problems, for instance, to testing scientific hypotheses, 
counterfactual reasoning or updating databases; in this section I will investigate its 
application to deriving nontrivial conclusions from inconsistent information. The 
reason why belief revision is a possible candidate framework for this purpose is that 
one way of characterizing the nontrivial consequences of inconsistent premises is 
defining them as the standard consequences of the set resulting from contracting 
"False" from the premises, an idea suggested by Alchourr6n and Makinson [1 ]. The 
belief revision  method  which  seems  best  suited  for  these  purposes  consists  of 
identifying all  maximal  consistent subsets,  i.e.  all  subtheories,  of the  premises, 
comparing them with respect to some ordering relation, and taking the intersection 
of all subtheories which are maximal in this ordering; to the result of this operation 
simply  standard  logic  can  be  applied.  This  is  called  "partial  meet  contraction" 
applied to  arbitrary  sets  [7, pp. 59, 80].  In the literature on belief revision several 
ways of comparing subtheories have been proposed. One of the best is Sartor's [21], 
particularly,sinceitcorrectlydeals with multiple conflicts of the type of example 2.3. 
Nevertheless,  all  definitions share  the  same core  idea:  they  all  compare sets  of 
formulas according to their minimal elements; and the problems already manifest 
themselves in cases  in  which the definitions boil down to  directly applying this 
criterion to the subtheories of the premises. For this reason I  will confine myself 
to discussing such cases. 
Consider first  an example in  which this method gives  satisfactory  results. 
Assume that the inconsistent set {p,~p,r}  is ordered as r > p,r > ~p, p = ~p. This 
set has two subtheories,  {p,r}  and {~p,r}; their minimal elements, p  and ~p, are 
of equal level, for which reason both sets are maximal in the ordering; their intersection 
is {r}, for which reason r is a nontrivial consequence of the premises, while nothing 
of interest can be concluded about p  or --,p. 
However, there are also cases in which the belief revision methods give less 
natural results. Consider the example of an incoherent university library regulation 
of which one section says that misbehaviour can lead to removal from the library, 
while another section says that professors cannot be forced to leave the library; and 
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regulation, saying that snoring is a case of misbehaviour. Finally, the facts, which 
are given highest priority, say that Bob is a professor who snores in the library. 
EXAMPLE 2.4. 
(1)  Misbehaves(x) D May-be-removed(x) 
(2)  Professor(x) D ~May-be-removed(x) 
(3)  Snores(x) D Misbehaves(x) 
(4)  Professor(Bob) ^  Snores(Bob) 
1<4,  1=2,3<1. 
If we assume (1), (2) and (3) to be instantiated for Bob, then this example has four 
subtheories,  each missing a  different element of the premise-set:  AI=  {1,2,3}, 
A2 =  {1,2,4},  A3 =  {1,3,4},  and  A4 =  {2,3,4}.  If ordered on the basis  of their 
minimal elements, their ordering is A1 < A2; A1 --- A3 = A4, which implies that the 
only maximal element of the set of subtheories is A2. What does it say about the 
consequences of Bob's snoring? Since (3) is not in A2, (1) cannot be used  any more 
to derive May-be-removed(Bob): the conclusion, then, is that Bob cannot be removed 
from the library. 
However, I want to argue for a different view on the example, a view which 
is  more  in  line  with  my  remarks  on  example 2.3.  On  the  one  hand,  clearly 
there is a potential conflict between the rules (1) and (2), since when a professor 
is  held  to  be  misbehaving a  choice must  be  made  about  which  of them  takes 
precedence. On the other hand it seems natural to say that there is no dispute that 
Bob  is  misbehaving:  in  the  same  way  as  in  example  2.3  it  can  be  said  that 
Misbehaves(Bob) is merely an intermediate conclusion for making (1) applicable, 
for  which reason (3)  is  irrelevant  to  the conflict about  whether Bob  should be 
removed from the library. Instead of preferring--1 May-be-removed(Bob) by rejecting 
the conclusion that Bob is misbehaving, it seems more natural to make a  choice 
between the norms which are certainly in conflict with each other, (1) and (2): and 
since these norms are of equal level, the outcome should be that the conflict cannot 
be resolved. 
For mathematicians a natural way of replying would be: "well, if (3) should 
stay, then the ordering should be changed: (3) should be higher than (I) and (2)". 
This, however, although it may be acceptable for mathematical purposes, is cognitively 
inadequate, since it does not capture the way hierarchies are used in legal reasoning: 
such a hierarchy does not depend on desired outcomes in individual cases but is, 
instead, assigned generally and used to solve individual conflicts. What is required 
in modelling this use is a modification of the formal definitions rather than a change 
in the assignment of a  specific ordering: premises like (3) should not be regarded 
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2.3.  BREWKA'S  PREFERRED  SUBTHEORIES  FRAMEWORK 
An alternative way of constructing the preferred maximal consistent subsets 
is the one of Brewka [3]. The idea is that on the basis of a  strict partial order of 
the individual premises a consistent set of premises is constructed by first adding 
as many formulas of the highest level to the set as is consistently possible, then 
adding as many formulas of the subsequent level as is consistently possible, and so 
on. If comparable formulas are in conflict, the resulting set branches into alternative 
and mutually exclusive sets. The nontrivial consequences of the initial premises can 
be defined as the standard consequences of the intersection of the resulting sets. 
Applied to  the  set  {p,~p,r}  with the ordering r>p,  r>--,p,  this  has  the 
following result. First r is added to the set and then a choice must be made between 
p  and --,p, since adding them both would make the set inconsistent. Since they are 
incomparable, the set branches into two alternative preferred subtheories, {p,r} and 
{~p,r}. The intersection of these sets is  {r}, which is the same outcome as in the 
belief revision methods. 
Let us now see how this method deals with example 2.4. First the facts (4) 
are added to the set, and then both norms about removal from the library, i.e. both 
(1) and (2), since without the lower norm (3) on snoring (1) cannot be used to derive 
May-be-removed(Bob),  for which reason no  contradiction occurs,  finally,  (3)  is 
considered:  adding this  implication to  the set would cause an inconsistency, for 
which reason it is left out. Thus the method of Brewka again results in the same 
set as the belief revision methods, viz.  { 1,2,4}, which makes it subject to the same 
criticism: it, in my opinion mistakenly, regards (3)  as relevant to the conflict. 
2.4.  DIAGNOSIS 
As already indicated, the problem with the methods of 2.1 and 2.2 is that they 
regard too many premises as  relevant to the conflict about whether Bob may be 
removed from the library: in both approaches it is all members of the (classically) 
minimal inconsistent set which are regarded as relevant, whereas example 2.4 has 
illustrated that often it is only a  subset of this set which matters: informally, only 
conditional rules with conflicting consequents are relevant to the conflict. At first 
sight this point seems to be rather ad hoc, in that it only pertains to the specific form 
of example 2.4. Nevertheless, it can be generalized if a different attitude is employed 
towards reasoning with inconsistent information, viz. if it is regarded as choosing 
between conflicting arguments instead of revising inconsistent premises. As already 
explained in the discussion of example 2.3,  this is a  step-by-step process and for 
this reason premises which are only needed to provide intermediate  conclusions of 
an argument should be regarded as irrelevant to conflicts about conclusions drawn 
in further steps of the argument. In example 2.4 this means that (3),  which in the 
argument for May-be-removed(Bob) is only used to derive the intermediate conclusion 
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Now if we loosely define an argument as a consistent set implying a conclusion, 
then at first sight nothing seems to have changed, since formally { 1-4}  not only 
contains  an  argument for  "Misbehaves(Bob)",  viz.  {3,4},  but  also  one  for  the 
opposite, viz.  { 1,2,4}. However, a more natural view seems to be that arguments 
such  as  the  one  for  "--,Misbehaves(Bob)"  are  not  constructible:  the  formal 
constructibility of this argument depends on the fact that the truth of"Misbehaves(Bob)" 
would lead to a conflict between two other norms, but the very idea of inconsistency 
handling  is to resolve such conflicts when they occur, and then it seems strange 
to allow arguments which are based on the idea that such conflicts cannot occur. 
And  if this observation is combined with the remarks on the step-by-step nature 
of constructing arguments, then we  have  a  general  reason  for  regarding  (3)  as 
irrelevant to  the conflicts: if rules  are  made subject to  conflict resolution meta- 
principles, they are defeasible: modus tollens and other contrapositive inferences 
are  invalid  for  them,  for  which  reason  no  argument  can  be  set  up  against 
Misbehaves(Bob). Therefore the premises should be represented with a defeasible 
conditional  instead  of  with  the  material  implication,  after  which the  undesired 
argument is invalidated. 
If we  again take a  look at Poole's framework, it is easy  to see that these 
considerations also provide a solution for Poole's problems with multiple conflicts 
in example 2.3,  since our conclusion was that,  rather than at  once, it  should be 
checked after each step whether the argument constructed thus far is strictly more 
specific than all counter-arguments. Moreover, also in Poole's framework the material 
implication gives rise to undesired counterarguments, as can easily be checked by 
considering an  example of the form  ~ =  {a D b,(b A C) D d,c D ~d},  FC =  {a,c}: 
while c  should intuitively be preferred, in the same way as in example 2.4 a non- 
defeated  argument  against  b  can  be  constructed.  Obviously  the just-proposed 
solution, formalizing defaults with a defeasible conditional, will also apply to this 
example. 
It is important to realize that the above problems cannot be solved by only 
replacing  standard  logic  with  some  nonmonotonic formalism,  since,  as  shown 
in [17], examples like example 2.4 can also be constructed in, for example, Brewka's 
prioritized default logic [4], which is in fact the default logic version of his preferred 
subtheories approach, and in Konolige's hierarchical autoepistemic logic  [8]:  the 
reason is that also these formalities fail to capture the step-by-step nature of comparing 
arguments. 
To  summarize the  results  of this  section,  we  have,  firstly,  concluded that 
theories  of  inconsistency  tolerant  reasoning  should  take  into account the step- 
by-step nature of argumentation; and we have, secondly, seen that the approach of 
modelling nonmonotonic reasoning as inconsistency tolerant reasoning in classical 
logic is more problematic than is often realized. For these reasons I will in the next 
section define the process of comparing arguments in an inductive way, and I will 
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3.  Comparing arguments in default logic 
As an attempt to solve the problems identified in the previous section, this 
section develops a  general framework for constructing and comparing arguments, 
combining an inductive definition of a preferred argument with default logic as the 
underlying formalism. Following a brief overview of default logic in 3.1, the formal 
definitions  will  be  given in  3.2,  while  some definitions  and  results  concerning 
default logic can be found in appendix A.  In fact, my choice of default logic is 
partly based  on pragmatic grounds, in that it may not be  the only logic  with  a 
suitable defeasible conditional. However, altematives on which an argumentation 
framework can be based do not seem to be available  yet: for example, in recent 
approaches based on conditional logic (e.g.  [5])  specificity is  not regarded  as  a 
conflict resolution metaprinciple, but as a principle of the semantics of defaults, for 
which reason the use of other standards to compare arguments is excluded. 
3.1.  DEFAULT  LOGIC 
Like  Poole's  framework,  also  default logic is  based  on  a  set  F  of facts, 
expressed in the language of first-order logic and assumed consistent, and a  set 8 
of defaults. However, a crucial difference between Poole's framework and default 
logic is that Reiter's defaults are inference rules: r  in which ~ is the prerequisite, 
V  the justification, and X the consequent, informally reads as "If ~ holds  and 
may be consistently assumed, X may be inferred". Because of this reading defaults 
are directional: neither modus tollens nor contraposition is valid for them. Unlike 
first-order logic is nonmonotonic. A logic is called "monotonic" if the set of theorems 
grows in case the set of premises grows: formally, if A c  B  then Th(A) ~  Th(B). 
Default logic does not have this property: if a default r  is used to infer Z, and 
after that --,~ is added to the facts, then the derivation of Z becomes invalid. 
Relative to a given default theory (F, 8) new beliefs can be derived by using 
ground instances of any default of 8 one wishes, as long as consistency is preserved. 
If as many defaults as possible are thus used, i.e. if applying any new default would 
cause an inconsistency, sets result which are called extensions of (F, 8). These sets 
can be regarded as possible maximal sets of beliefs which may be held on the basis 
of the facts F and default assumptions ~i. Since defaults can conflict, a default theory 
may have several, mutually inconsistent, extensions. Extensions are similar to the 
deductive closure of the preferred subtheories in the above approaches. 
Now below the idea is to represent the facts of the case at hand as elements 
of F, together with necessary truths such as "a man is a person" or "a lease contract 
is a contract", and to formalize defeasible rules as normal defaults r  in this 
paper written as ~ :=~ V. Unconditional defeasible rules will be represented as defaults 
of the form =~ ~,  which is  shorthand for  7- =~ ~,  where  7-  stands  for any valid 
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3.2.  CONSTRUCTING  AND COMPARING ARGUMENTS 
In this subsection the above ideas will be formalized in the form of a framework 
for  constructing and  comparing arguments. The  framework will  be  of a  general 
nature, in that it allows for any standard for comparing pairs of arguments. It will 
be  developed in  three  stages.  First  the  notion of an  argument and  some  related 
notions will be defined, and then it will be defined what it means that an argument 
is preferred. To capture the intended generality of the framework the latter definition 
will assume the existence of some unspecified standard R  for comparing pairs of 
arguments; the only assumptions which will be made about R is that it is an asymmetric 
and  upwardly bounded relation (below we  will sometimes call  such a  standard  a 
"kind  of defeat").  It  is  this  part  of the  framework where,  for  example,  Poole's 
specificity definition or a standard on the basis of default orderings can be applied; 
this will be discussed in detail in the next section. The final stage is the definition 
of a  unique set of formulas which are the "defeasible" consequences of a  triple 
(F,~,R), where F and 6 are the facts and defaults of a default theory, and R is a kind 
of defeat.  As  for the presentation of the framework,  it  should  be  noted  that  all 
definitions below are given at the background of a  fixed default theory (F, ~5). 
To start with arguments, they will be formally defined as a set of facts and 
a set of defaults, i.e. as a default theory. The facts are the set F of the background 
default theory (F, ~5), while the defaults are a subset of the set of ground instances 
of 5.  A  reasonable view on arguments is that they should be internally coherent, 
which view  will  be  formalized  by  requiring  that  they  have  unique  extensions; 
furthermore, all defaults of an argument are required to be applicable. Finally, if 
a  formula ~  is in the extension of a  certain argument A,  A  is  said to explain ~. 
DEFINITION 3.1 
a.  A = (F, D) (where D is a finite subset of ground instances of 5) is an argument 
iff it has a  unique extension E(A)  such that of all elements of D  both the 
prerequisites and the consequents are in E(A). 
b.  A  explains a  formula ~ iff ~  is in E(A). 
c.  A' = (F, D') is a subargument of an argument A = (F, D) iff A' is an argument 
and if D' c  D. 
d.  AminimalIyexplains ~ iff A explains ~ and no subargument of A explains r 
e.  r  is a final conclusion of an argument A iff A minimally explains ~; r  is an 
intermediate conclusion  of A  iff a  subargument of A  explains ~. 
f.  The combination of two arguments A = (F, D) and A' = (F, D') is the argument 
(F,D uD')  which, overloading the symbol "u", will be denoted by A u  A'. 
Consider by way of illustration of the notion of a  subargument D =  {  a :=~ b, 
b=~ c}, Fc =  {a}, andA = (Fc, D).  Then (Fc,{a =~ b}  is a  subargument of A, but 
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COROLLARY 3.2 
(i)  Every argument has only a  finite number of subarguments. 
(ii)  If A is an argument explaining ~ but not minimally, then A has a subargument 
minimally explaining ~. 
REMARK 3.3 
It may be instructive to remark that condition (b) of definition 3.1 is equivalent 
to "A explains a formula r  iff F u  CONS(D) ~ r  (cf. definition A.2 and the remark 
on proposition A.4 in appendix A; CONS(D) denotes the set of consequents of all 
defaults in D). 
The second element of the framework is the definition of a preferred argument, i.e. 
of an argument which is better than any counterargument. As just noted, it will in 
this  section  simply be  assumed that  some  standard  for  comparing arguments is 
defined. In order to reflect the step-by-step nature of argumentation the notion of 
a preferred argument is defined inductively: the idea is that in each inductive step 
arguments are only compared with respect to their final conclusions; the preferred 
status of intermediate conclusions should already have been established at earlier 
steps  in  the  induction.  Conflicts  about  final  conclusions will  be  captured  by  a 
notion of "minimal interference", defined in the following definition. 
DEFINITION 3.4 
(1)  An  argument  Ai  interferes  with  an  argument  Aj  iff  Ai  and  Aj  explain 
contradictory  facts. Furthermore, iff Aj interferes with  Ai,  then  Aj  is  a 
counterargument of Ai. 
(2)  Aiminimallyinterferes with Aj with respect to t~ iff Ai minimally explains 
and Aj minimally explains --,~. 
Another aspect of arguments which should be dealt with is that they can have more 
than one final conclusion, even logically independent ones: consider 8 =  {a ~  b}, 
Fc =  {a,(b D c}: both "b"  and "c" are final conclusions of this argument. For this 
reason  an  argument is  preferred  only  if it  passes  the  test  of R  for all  its  final 
conclusions. Finally, the definition should account for the possibility that an argument 
which is  not itself better than a counterargument is still saved by another argument 
which is better than this counterargument. This Will be called reinstatement. 
I will now present the definition which formalizes these observations. Since 
it is the central definition of the framework we will present it with some care: first 
I give a more intuitive definition, which at first sight would seem to work well, but 
which will appear to be too simple. Recall that R  is a variable for a  specific kind 
of defeat, assumed to be an asymmetric relation on arguments; if there is no danger 
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DEFINITION 3.5 
(preferred arguments:first attempt).  An argument A = (F, D) is a R-preferred 
argument iff 
(1)  All subarguments of A  are R-preferred arguments; 
(2)  Forallformulas ~ and arguments A' such that A minimally interferes with A' 
with respect to ~ and such that neither A' nor one of its subarguments is R- 
defeated by another R-preferred argument: A R-defeats A' with respect to ~. 
Because of the condition that all subarguments of an argument are also preferred, 
condition (1) ensures that multiple conflicts are dealt with correctly. Condition (2) 
formalizes the requirement that for all final conclusions an  argument must itself 
defeat all arguments for a contradicting fact, unless these are already defeated by 
another preferred argument, which thereby reinstates the initial argument. 
The reason that this definition is not satisfactory is that it is circular, which 
manifests itself in examples of the following kind. 
EXAMPLE 3.6 
(1)  a=~b  (2)  (bAC)~d 
(3)  c ~  d  (4)  (a A d) ~  ",b 
FC =  {a,c},  8 =  {1-4} 
Let  A1 = (Fc,{1,2})  and  A2 = (Fc,{3,4})  and  assume that  the kind of defeat  is 
specificity (S-defeat).  In order to know whether A1  is  S-preferred we must first 
determine whether A1 S-defeats A' with respect to d, where A2' = (F, {3}). Although 
S-defeat is not yet formally defined, this definition will obviously be such that A1 
indeed  S-defeats A2'. Furthermore, we must also know whether AI' = (F, { 1 })  is 
S-preferred: A2 will indeed S-defeat A' with respect to b, but there is a problem, 
since,  as just explained,  A1  S-defeats  A2'  with  respect to  d,  and  A2"  is  a  sub- 
argument of A2.  Does  this  mean that A2 is by condition (1) of definition 3.5 not 
an S-preferred argument? This would be the case if A1  were S-preferred, but this 
is what we are trying to find out! Here the definition turns out to be circular. For 
this reason I will rewrite the conditions (1) and (2) as conditions on sets of arguments, 
denoted by R-PA, and I  will define the set of preferred arguments as the smallest 
set of arguments satisfying these conditions. 
DEFINITION 3.7 
(preferred arguments).  Let R-PA be a set of arguments satisfying the following 
two requirements 
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(2)  A  is in R-PA iff for all arguments B  and formulas r  such that A minimally 
interferes with respect to r  B  or one of its subarguments is R-defeated by 
another of R-PA, or A  R-defeats B  with respect to r 
Then an  argument is  an R-preferred argument iff it is in the  smallest set R-PA 
satisfying these requirements. 
COROLLARY 3.8 
For any set R-PA it holds that its elements do not interfere with each other. 
The reason why this definition does not loop in example 3.6 is that we can construct 
a  set of PA from which all arguments involved in the loop are removed. This set 
still satisfies the conditions (1) and (2) of definition 3.7: the fact that PA does not 
contain A1  and A2 satisfies condition (1)  since not all of their subarguments are 
in PA,  and the fact that PA does not contain AI' and A2" satisfies condition (2) 
since these arguments are S-defeated by arguments which do not interfere with any 
other element of PA. 
It should of course be proven that the set of preferred arguments is indeed 
the smallest, i.e.  a  unique  set satisfying (1)  and (2). 
PROPOSITION 3.9 
For all R  there is a  smallest set R-PA satisfying conditions (1)  and (2) of 
definition 3.7. 
Because  of  this  result definition 3.7  can  without harm be  read  as  its  simpler 
version 3.5.  This is what I  will do in the rest of this paper. 
It is often useful to speak of a "defeated (sub-)  argument". 
DEFINITION 3.10 
A is an R-defeated (sub-) argument iff A explains a formula r  such that there 
is an R-preferred argument for --,r 
COROLLARY 3.11 
If (F, D) is an R-defeated argument, then for every superset D' D D the argument 
(F, D')  is R-defeated. 
An interesting aspect of definition 3.7 is that it leaves room for a non-empty class 
of arguments which are neither preferred, nor defeated. For instance, in example 3.6 
all arguments are of this type. The significance of this class is that an argument need 
not itself be preferred in order to prevent another argument from being preferred; 
it need merely be defensible. Assume by way of illustration that A and B minimally 
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other argument. Assume furthermore that neither of the arguments R-defeats  the 
other. Then neither of them is preferred since they do not satisfy condition (2), but 
then also neither of them is  defeated,  since the only argument with which they 
interfere is not preferred. For this reason a third class of so-called defensible arguments 
can be defined. 
DEFINITION 3.12 
An argument is R-defensible iff it is neither an R-preferred nor an R-defeated 
argument. 
At  this  stage  the  third  part  of the  framework can  be  defined,  the  set  of 
defeasible knowledge of a  default theory plus a kind of defeat R:  this set should 
contain the facts for which there is an argument which according to R is better than 
any competing argument. Accordingly, it is simply defined as the collection of all 
formulas explained by some preferred argument. The term "defeasible" refers to the 
nonmonotonic nature of the theory: if the set of facts F  of a  default theory (F,~5) 
is extended, then it might be that some consequences cease to be preferred. 
DEFINITION 3.13 
The set of defeasible knowledge DK(F, 8,R) is the set of all formulas explained 
by an R-preferred argument (F,D)  such that D g;: ~5. 
A  natural requirement for a  theory of preferred defeasible knowledge is that if a 
formula  is  deductively  implied by preferred formulas, it is also itself preferred. 
In the present framework this  depends on the kind of defeat which is  used (cf. 
section 4). 
This completes the design of a general framework for comparing arguments. 
It should again be stressed that the framework does not refer to any specific kind 
of defeat, for which reason it can serve as a general framework for any theory of 
comparing pairs of arguments. This will be further illustrated in the next section, 
where alternatively two kinds of defeat will be defined. 
4.  Kinds of defeat 
In this section two ways of comparing pairs of arguments will be analyzed: 
Poole's specificity definition and using hierarchical orderings of the set of defaults. 
4.1.  SPECIFICITY 
As we concluded in section 2.1, one problem with Poole's specificity definition 
is that it is not embedded in a general context for comparing arguments, for which 
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used. As a solution to this problem I will now embed Poole's specificity definition 
in the  framework developed in  the previous section.  The  adaptation of Poole's 
original definition to default logic is straightforward, but first a problem motivating 
a small change of this definition should be discussed; the discovery of this problem 
is due to Loui and Stiefvater [10], who solve it in a different way than I  will do. 
As the next example shows, the notion of a "possible situation in which an argument 
applies" should be defined carefully. 
EXAMPLE 4.1 
A1  =Fcu  {e=~c  d=~b  b^c=~a} 
A2  =Fcu  {d=~b  b=:~a} 
Fc  =  {d,el 
Intuitively, A1 should be strictly more specific with respect to a than A2. However, 
according to Poole's definition this is not the case, since there is  a  possible fact 
making A1 explain a without making A2 explain ~ a: this possible fact is c A (C D b). 
The  problem  is  that  this  fact  "sneaks"  a  new  way  of deriving  an  intermediate 
conclusion into the argument by introducing a new "link" c D b, thereby intuitively 
making it a different argument: with the possible fact the argument A1 uses another 
default to  explain b  than with the actual  facts, viz.  e =~ c instead of d =~ b,  and 
therefore it cannot be  said that A1  itself applies in the possible situation. 
The solution is to require that if an argument A = (Fc u  Fn, D) explains ~, 
a possible  fact  Fp  can  only  be said to make A  itself explain r  if ({ Fp} u  Fn, D) 
does  not use other defaults to explain ~ than A does. Applied to example 4.1, what 
we do not want to have is that e ^  (c D b) is a possible fact making A1 explain b; 
only facts with which A1 uses the same defaults (viz. d =~ b) to explain b  as with 
Fc should be "valid" possible facts making A1 explain b.  In fact, it is even a bit 
more complicated, since the same should hold for eventual other conclusions made 
explainable by the possible fact: also this should be done via the same defaults as 
with Fc. Now the set of defaults "used" by an argument to explain a  formula will 
be defined as a minimal set of defaults of which the consequents together with the 
facts deductively imply the formula. 
DEFINITION 4.2 
Let  A = ~, D)  be  a  normal default theory. Then  a  ~implying  set A ~ is  a 
minimal set D' c_ D such that F L: CONS(D') ~ r  If~ is left unspecified, I will also 
call this a  conclusion  implying set. 
Consider by way of example the argument A = ({a}, {a =:> b,b =:> c}). A  c =  {b ~  c}, 
but A  b^c =  {a => b, b =:~ c}. A further complication in solving the problems is that 
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b :=~ (e ^  (c D d)), e =~ c}  and  q = d.  Then  ({a},D)  has  two  d-implying  sets, 
viz.  {a =:~ (b ^  (c D d)), e :=~ c}  and  b ::~ (e ^  (c D d)),  e =~ c}.  For  this  reason 
definition 4.3, defining when a possible fact makes an argument explain a conclusion, 
has to quantify over v-implying sets. In this definition u A  ~' denotes the set of all 
sets A  r  of an argument A  explaining ~. 
DEFINITION 4.3 
If A = (Fc u  Fn, D) explains 0, then a possible fact Fp makes A  explain  r  iff 
(1)  E(Fn u  {Fp},D) ~ r 
(2)  for all V explained by A  such that E(Fn u  {Fp},D)~ V: u (Fn u  {Fp},D)  TM 
= uA  v. 
The  idea  of  clause (2) is that for all formulas explained by A  with the possible 
fact Fp it needs exactly the same defaults for doing so as it needs with the contingent 
facts Fc; this holds for both all its final conclusions and all its subconclusions. This 
in fact reduces the role of possible facts to  "filling in" prerequisites of defaults, 
which seems to be their proper role. 
I  admit that thus the theory on specificity has become rather complex, but 
it should be stressed that this problem is not caused by the present framework: it 
is a problem of Poole's original specificity definition; my framework is designed 
in such a  way that if a better way of formalizing specificity is found, it can also 
be incorporated in the framework.  Anyway, the adaptation of Poole's specificity 
definition to default logic is now straightforward. 
DEFINITION 4.4 
(1)  A1 = (Fc U Fn, D1) is more specific than A2 = (Fc u  Fn, D2) with respect to 
(m.s.r  iff: if A2 explains ~,  then there is  a possible fact Fp such that: 
Fp makes A2 explain ~; 
Fp does not make A1  explain ~; 
Fp does not make A1  explain ~r 
(2)  A1 is strictly more specific (s.m.s.) than A2 with respect to r  iff A1 m.s., A2 
and not A2 m.s.r A1. 
At  first  sight  it  would now  seem to suffice to say "A1 S-defeats A2 with respect 
to ~ iff A1 s.m.s.r A2". However, again a problem has to be discussed, which this 
time is due to the present framework. Consider the following example. 
EXAMPLE 4.5 
DI:  {a=~b,  b::~c,  c~d} 
D2:  {a=~b,  b=~c,  c:=~e, 
Fc=  {a} 
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It  would  seem  that  A = (Fc, D1)  is  preferred,  since  A1  is  strictly  more  specific 
with respect to d  than A2 = (Fc, D2):  all possible facts which make A1 explain d 
imply c and therefore make A2 explain --,d, while, on the other hand, e is a possible 
fact making A2 explain ---,d without making A1 explain d. However, if the example 
is  examined  more closely, more formulas can be found about which A1  and A2 
are  in  conflict:  one  of  them  is  the  conjunction  of all intermediate conclusions 
of A2 and its final conclusion, b A C ^  e ^-,d.  Clearly, this formula is explained 
minimally  by  A2  and,  moreover,  its  negation  is  explained  by  A1,  since 
d ~ --,(b ^  c ^  e ^  --,d). Now, with respect to this formula A1  is not strictly more 
specific than A2, since c is a possible fact which makes A1 explain --,(b A C A e A ",d) 
without  making  A2  explain  the  opposite. Clearly,  this  is  counterintuitive,  and 
therefore conflicts about conjunctions of intermediate and final conclusions should 
not count for S-defeat if there are also conflicts about "real" final conclusions. To 
meet this requirement a notion of "conflicting with" will be used, which is defined 
in definition 4.6. 
DEFINITION 4.6 
A  conflicts  with A' with respect to t~ iff 
(1)  A  and A' minimally interfere with respect to ~; 
(2)  If 0? or ~p  is deductively implied by a conjunction of a final conclusion V 
and an intermediate conclusion X of A but not by ~  alone, then A and A' do 
not minimally interfere with respect to V. 
In words this definition says that if ~ or ~  is a "conjunctive" conclusion of one 
of the arguments, then there should be no "conjoining" conclusion with respect to 
which they also minimally interfere. In example 4.5 this ensures that A1  and A2 
do not conflict with respect to the conjunctive conclusion b A C A e A --,d, since this 
formula is the conjunction of the intermediate conclusions b, c  and e  and the final 
conclusion --,d, it is not implied by --,d, while finally, AI  and A2 also minimally 
interfere with respect to d. 
Now S-defeat can be defined. 
DEFINITION 4.7 
A1  S-defeats  A2  with  respect  to  ~  iff:  for  all formulas ~  such that A1 
and A2 conflict with respect to V, A1  s.m.s, v A2. 
REMARK 4.8 
Because of definition 4.7 clause (2) of definition 3.7 can for S-defeat be read 
as:  For  all  formulas ~  and arguments A' such that A conflicts with A' with respec! 
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reason is that for every 0 mentioned in definition 4.7 the set of all ~  mentioned in 
this definition is the same. 
The  next  proposition  ensures  that  the  assumption  of  the previous section that 
R-defeat is asymmetric is justified for S-defeat. 
PROPOSITION 4.9 
S-defeat is asymmetric. 
In the previous section it was said that the deductive closure of DK depends on the 
kind of defeat which is used. For S-defeat the deductive closure indeed holds. 
THEOREM 4.10 
For every normal default theory (F, 5), DK(F, ~, S) is deductively closed. 
Furthermore, it can be shown that DK is the extension of the default theory consisting 
of F and the set of all defaults which are used in any S-preferred argument, which 
set is denoted by D  pref. 
THEOREM 4.1 l 
For every normal default theory (F,8), DK(F,8,S) is the unique extension of 
(F, Dpref). 
4.2.  ORDERINGS  OF DEFAULTS 
In  this  subsection  I  will  formalize  reasoning  with  hierarchically ordered 
premises. In order to apply the framework to this kind of reasoning I will replace 
definition 4.7 of S-defeat by a definition of "hierarchical defeat", which assumes 
the set of defaults ~5 to be ordered by a partial preorder -<s (normally, the subscript 
will be omitted). To satisfy the conclusions of section 2, the definitions should take 
care of two things: they should identify the defaults which are relevant to a conflict, 
and they should tell how to compare the relevant sets of conflicting arguments. The 
relevant defaults are picked out by definition 4.14~ according to the following idea. 
Informally,  since  intermediate conclusions  should  not  be  relevant  to  a  conflict 
between arguments, we would like to identify exactly the defaults which are "at the 
end of the argument chain" for ~; intermediate conclusions are then dealt with by 
the inductive part of definition 3.7. Note that, since the test for H-defeat will only 
be  applied to  formulas  which are explained minimally, it  suffices  to  define the 
relevant set for such formulas. Now for minimally explained formulas there will be 
no rules at the end of the chain (which we will call "top  rules") which are not 
needed for explaining it, otherwise they should be deleted from the argument, which 
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we can regard all top rules of the argument as relevant. This leads to the following 
definition, which is inspired by a  similar definition in [10]. 
DEFINITION 4.12 
Let r  be a  formula minimally explained by A = (F, D). 
-  d~D  is a  top rule ofA  iff (F,D-{d}) explains the prerequisite old. 
-  The ~-relevant  set of A, denoted by [r  is the set of all top rules of A. 
Consider by way of illustration F =  {a}, dl = a =~ b, d2 = b =~ c. Now [b](F, {dl }) 
=  {dl},[c](F,{dl,d2})= [bAc](F,{dl,d2})=  {d2}.  Note  that  dl  is not  in  the 
latter set, which is in fact the relevant set of a conjunction of an intermediate and 
a  "real"  final  conclusion;  this  shows  that  the  problems  with  defining  S-defeat 
illustrated by example 4.5 do not occur with H-defeat, since defaults not needed for 
the "real" final conclusion of an argument will not be among the top rules of the 
argument. 
The following fact ensures that the priority test will always be  applied to 
unique relevant sets. 
FACT 4.13 
If an argument A  minimally explains a  formula r  [r  is unique. 
For comparing the relevant sets of conflicting arguments a reasonable standard 
seems to be the one according to which an argument A for ~ hierarchically defeats 
an  argument A' for --,~  iff all members of [r  are higher than all members of 
[--,r  Below ---~o(s) is  an ordering on the power set of ~5,  i.e.  on the set of all 
subsets of &The subscript will be omitted if there is no danger for confusion. 
DEFINITION 4.14 
1.  A = (F,D) is higher than A' = (F,D') with respect to ~ (notation: A >, A') iff 
for every d ~ [0]A and d' ~ [~r  holds: d >~ d'. (notation: [d?]A >~(~) [~r 
2.  An argument A  H-defeats an argument A' with respect to 0  iff A  >-r A'. 
For H-defeat the same formal properties hold as  for S-defeat. 
PROPOSITION 4.15 
H-defeat is asymmetric. 
THEOREM 4.16 
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THEOREM 4.17 
For every normal default theory (F,8),  DK(F,8,H)  is the unique extension 
of (F, DPref). 
4.3.  COMBINING  KINDS OF DEFEAT 
Once various individual kinds of defeat have been investigated, the question 
naturally arises as to whether they can or even must be combined. Often specificity 
is regarded as the only criterion for comparing contradicting defeasible conclusions, 
but philosophically this  is  inadequate;  for example, in  legal  reasoning conflicts 
between arguments are solved by a combined application of several conflict resolution 
metarules, based on hierarchical relations between norms, on specificity and on the 
time of enactment of norm. The general nature of the present argumentation framework 
also allows the definition of a combined use of kinds of defeat, However, because 
of space limitations the reader is referred to [17] for an extensive treatment of this 
topic. 
5.  Some applications 
In this section the formal theory of the previous sections is applied to some 
examples. I  will alternatively use S-defeat and H-defeat. 
EXAMPLE 5.1 
First it is shown how the present framework copes with the snoring-professor. 
(1)  Misbehaves(x) =* May-be-removed(x) 
(2)  Professeor(x) =* ~May-be-removed(x) 
(3)  Snores(x)=, Misbehaves(x) 
Fc =  {Professor(Bob) ^  Snores(Bob)}, 5= {1-3};  1 ---2;  3 <  1 
A1 = (F, {1,3}) is an argument for May-be-removed(Bob), while A2 = (F, {2}) is an 
argument for the  opposite.  If we  apply  H-defeat,  then  the  sets  relevant  to  the 
conflict are [May-be-removed(Bob)]A1 =  {  1  } and [-,May-be-removed(Bob)]A2 =  {2}. 
Since the only elements of these sets  are  of equal  level,  neither A1,  nor A2  is 
preferred: both are merely H-defensible arguments. Note that, as desired, {3} is not 
in any relevant set. 
EXAMPLE 5.2 
The next example shows that the definitions are capable of handling exceptions 
to  exceptions.  It  consists  of a  rule stating  that  contracts  bind  only  the  parties 
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new owners of the house and an exception to this exception in case the tenant has 
agreed by contract with the opposite.  In default logic: 
(4)  Contract(x) =, Binds-only-parties(x) 
(5)  House-lease-contract(x) =:> (7 Binds-only-parties(x) A Binds-all-owners(x)) 
(6)  House-lease-contract(x) A Tenant-agreed-by(x) =, Binds-only-parties(x) 
Fn =  {  Vx(House-lease-contract(x) D Contract(x))} 
Fc =  {House-lease-contract(c) A Tenant-agreed,by(c)}, 8 =  {4-6} 
A3= (Fc u  Fn, {4})  explains Binds-only-parties(c),  A4 = (Fc u  Fn, {5}) explains 
~Binds-only-parties(c), and A5 = (Fc u  Fn, {6}) again explains Binds-only-parties(c). 
Clearly A4 is strictly more specific with respect to Binds-only-parties(c) than A3. 
However, in order tobe S-preferred, A4 must also defeat A5, but it is the other way 
around, since A5 s.m.S.Binds.only.parties(c)  A4. Therefore A5 is an S-preferred argument 
and the consequent of (5) is not in DK. Note also that A5  reinstates  A3. 
EXAMPLE 5.3 
This example illustrates the inductive part of the definitions. 
Likes-beer =, --1 Individualistic 
Young =, Ambitious 
Ambitious =, Individualistic 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10)  Young ^  Unemployed =:, --,Ambitious 
Fc =  {Likes-beer, Young, Unemployed}, 5= {7-10} 
A6 = (Fc, {7})  explains  "--,Individualistic"  while  A7 = (Fc, {8,9})  explains 
"Individualistic". Although not A6 s.m.S.individualisti  e A7, A6 is still S-preferred, since 
A7  contains  an  S-defeated subargument,  viz.  (Fc, {8}),  explaining  "Ambitious", 
which is defeated by (Fc, { 10}),  explaining the opposite. 
EXAMPLE 5.4 
Assume example 5.1 is modified to the effect that the lower regulation itself 
tries to put a  sanction on misbehaviour. 
(1)  Misbehaves(x) ~  May-be-removed(x) 
(2)  Professor(x) =, --1May-be-removed(x) 
(3")  Snores(x) =~ Misbehaves(x) A May-be-removed(x) 
F =  {Professor(Bob) A Snores(Bob)}, ~ =  {1,2,3'};  1 -- 2;  3 < 1 
This  time  the  outcome  is  that  --,May-be-removed(Bob)  is  H-preferred,  since 
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removed(Bob), viz. (F, {  3' }), and [May-be-removed(Bob)](F, {  3' }  ) =  {  3' }, [ ~ May- 
be-removed(Bob)](F, {2}) =  {2}  and 3' < 2.  Hence, (F, {1,3'}) now has a defeated 
subargument and is therefore itself defeated, although there is no argument against 
Misbehaves(Bob).  At  first  sight  this  seems  unsatisfactory,  but  in  my  view  the 
correct answer in this example depends on whether the two consequents of (3') are 
regarded as connected or not, and since this is not a logical but a legal matter, a 
formal system should have ways of formalizing both possibilities, In the present 
system this can indeed be done: the altemative interpretation can be presented if 3' 
is split into the next two defaults. 
3"  Snores(x) ~  Misbehaves(x) 
3"  Snores(x) =~ May-be-removed(x) 
Thus (F, {3"}) is a preferred argument for Misbehaves(Bob), for which reason the 
same outcome is obtained as in the original example. 
EXAMPLE 5.5: INAPPLICABILITY  OF DEFAULTS 
Sometimes a default ~ =, ~  is regarded inapplicable in special circumstances, 
but the opposite conclusion --,~ is not drawn. Pollock [12]  calls  such exceptions 
"undercutting defeaters".  In  the  present  framework  this can be formalized with 
the  well-known techniques of general exception predicates and naming defaults. 
The  idea  is  to  add to  the prerequisite of a  general rule  a  condition expressing 
"there is no exception to this rule", and to assert the truth of this condition by way 
of an unconditional default. Below (11)  is  such a  general rule  and (12)  such an 
unconditional default, while (13) is an undercutting defeater. Note that (12) contains 
a  variable for names of defaults, for which reason it can make any other default 
inapplicable. 
(ll)  Ax^~Exc(11,x)=~Bx 
(12)  ::0 --,Exc(n,x) 
(13)  Cx ~  Exc(11,x) 
Now ifFc =  {Aa, Ca}, then the effect of (13) is that A8 = (Fc, { 13}) s.m.S.Exe(n,a) A9 
= (Fc, {  12}), for which reason A10 = (Fc, { 11, 12}), explaining Ba, contains an S- 
defeated subargument, for which reason Ba is not in DK. However, neither is ~Ba, 
since it is not explained by any argument. 
EXAMPLE 5.6 
The last example illustrates an issue for further research. 
(14)  a~(b^d) 
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(16)  a =~ (b ^~d) 
F=  {a},  5=  {14-16};  15 = 16,  14 < 15 
Both  if only  (15)  and  if  only  (16)  were  in  5,  (F,{14})  would  be  H-defeated; 
however, since (15) and (16) are both in 5, the irresolvable conflict between (F, { 15}) 
and (F, {  16}) secures (F, { 14}) from being defeated, which intuitively seems strange: 
it seems that at least (b  v  d) should be in DK (v_ stands for "exclusive or"). 
6.  Related research 
In  recent  years,  the  idea of regarding defeasible reasoning as constructing 
and comparing alternative arguments has also been developed by some other researchers. 
The most close to the present investigations are Simari and Loui [22], who combine 
Poole's  theory comparator with the  ideas  of Pollock  [12]  on  the  interaction of 
arguments.  Their  definition  of  arguments  and subarguments is almost the same 
as  mine  and  they,  too,  use  a  metalinguistic  connective  to  represent  defeasible 
statements; although they do not regard this connective as a Reiter-like default, their 
and my requirements are internally coherent (in my terms: that they have a unique 
extension)  seems  to  make  the  two  connectives  equivalent  with  respect  to  the 
argumentation systems. Nevertheless, there are some significant differences with the 
present approach. The first is the definition of a preferred argument, for which Simari 
and Loui  adapt the one of [12], which does not explicitly reflect the step-by-step 
nature of argumentation. Other differences are that Simari and Loui only consider 
specificity as a kind of defeat, have no proof of the deductive closure of the set of 
preferred conclusions and do not discuss the problem of conjunctions of intermediate 
and  final  conclusions.  On  the  other hand,  they prove  more  formal properties  of 
arguments and they thoroughly discuss the prospects for implementation, with some 
interesting formal results. 
Formally less  close  to  the  present  framework but  concemed with  similar 
problems  is  Vreeswijk  [23].  He  uses  an  idea  which is  also  used  by  Lin  and 
Shoham  [9];  the  language  in  which defeasible  information is  formulated is  left 
unspecified and defeasible inference rules are not domain specific, as in [22]  and 
the present system, but general inference rules, assumed to receive their justification 
from  the  logical  interpretation  of the  object  language.  For  example,  Vreeswijk 
copes with defeasible statements by assuming an object language with a defeasible 
connective a > b and by stating a defeasible inference rule of the form {a > b,a} :=~ b, 
assuming that this is justified by the logical interpretation of >. Unlike [9], which 
is only concerned with capturing existing nonmonotonic logics in its  framework, 
Vreeswijk adds to this the possibility to compare arguments. Interestingly, while [22] 
and the present framework define arguments as deductively closed, Vreeswijk regards, 
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7.  Implementation 
The aim of this paper has not been to give a procedure for determining which 
arguments are preferred, but to give a definition of what it means that an argument 
is preferred. As  a  consequence, the  present theory is not very well suited  for a 
straightforward implementation. Moreover, implementing the full theory is problematic 
for a  number of reasons.  Firstly,  it uses  the  full expressive power of first-order 
predicate logic, for which as a whole to date no theorem provers exist which are 
both  complete  and  efficient.  Furthermore,  default  logic  is  known  to  be  non- 
semidecideable, in the sense that there is no algorithm which guarantees that every 
formula which is in some extension is shown to be in an extension [ 18].  Finally, 
unlike theorem provers for standard logics, which can stop when a proof has been 
found, systems which try to find best argument will have to continue searching the 
whole space of possible counterarguments. 
In practice, problems of efficiency may be dealt with by restricting the language 
to  an efficiently computable  fragment,  for example,  to  clause  logic,  as  in  [11]. 
Moreover, efficiency may be increased by sacrificing completeness with respect to 
our theory. Nevertheless, however difficult the implementation of the theory developed 
in this paper may be, it does at least make it possible to formulate exactly in which 
respects practical applications are or have to be imperfect, which makes the present 
study valuable as a piece of fundamental research. 
8.  Conclusion 
Inspired by a formal analysis of legal reasoning, this article has investigated 
nontrivial reasoning with inconsistent information. Two important conclusions have 
emerged, both revealing that the  formalization of this  kind of reasoning is  more 
complicated  than is generally acknowledged in AI research. The first conclusion 
is that  reasoning with inconsistent information should be modelled as  constructing 
and  comparing  incompatible  arguments,  in  a  way  which  reflects  the step-by- 
step  nature  of argumentation.  However, this  is  not  sufficient, since  the  second 
conclusion is that a theory of argumentation still faces serious problems if standard 
logic is not abandoned as the knowledge representation language: the reason is that 
the  strong  logical properties  of the  material  implication give  rise  to  arguments 
which in actual reasoning are not constructed. For this reason approaches to formalizing 
nonmonotonic reasoning by changing the way logic is used rather than changing the 
logic itself are far less attractive than is often claimed. It has turned out that the 
argumentation framework in default logic developed in this study respects the two 
conclusions. A further attractive feature of the framework is that it allows for the 
definition of any particular standard for comparing pairs of arguments, including 
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Appendix A:  Some definitions and theorems of Reiter [18] 
DEFINITION A.1 
(defaults) [18, p. 88]. A default is any expression of the form o~(x): ]31(x)  ..... 
~m(X)/00(x), where (z(x),  ~t(x) .....  ~n(x) and co(x) are first-order predicate logic 
well-formed formulas of which the free variables are among those of x = x 1  .....  x n. 
or(x)  is  called  the prerequisite,  ~l(x) ......  ~m(X) the just~caaons  and  0~(x) the 
consequent.  A  normal default is a default of the form ot(x):co(x)/co(x). 
A  default theory is a  pair (F,8)  where 8 is a  set of defaults and F  a  set of 
closed first-order predicate logic well-formed formulas. A  normal default theory is 
a  default theory with only normal defaults. 
DEFINITION A.2 
If 8  is any set of defaults, then 
PRE(8) is the set of prerequisites of all defaults of 5. 
CONS(8) is the set of consequents of all defaults of 5. 
DEFINITION A.3 
(extension)  [18, def. 1].  Let  (F,D) be a closed default theory. For any set 
of  closed  wff's  let  I'(S)  be  the  smallest  set  satisfying  the  following  three 
properties: 
(i)  F c  F(S) 
(ii)  Th(F(S)) -  F(S) 
(iii)  If co: ~t .....  ~m/rO ~ D and o~ ~ F(S), and ~131  .....  ~m  ~ S, then co ~ F(S). 
A  set of closed wff's E  is an extension  of (F,D) iff F(E) = E, i.e. iff E  is a fixed 
point of the operator F. 
PROPOSITION A.4 
[18, Th. 2.5].  Suppose E  is  an extension for a  closed default theory (F,5). 
Then E = Th(F u  CONS(GO(F,5))). 
REMARK 
GD(F,8) is the set of members of 8  which are applicable, i.e. of which the 
justifications are consistent with E and therefore in E. By definition 3.1 all defaults 
of an argument are applicable. Hence, proposition A_4 and definition 3.1 imply that 
a  formula 0  is explained by an argument (F,D) iff F u  CONS(D) ~ r 
PROPOSITION A.5 
[18, corr. 3.4].  Suppose (F,5)is  a  closed normal default theory  such that 
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PROPOSITION A.6 
(semi-monotonicity of normal default theories) [ 18, th. 3.2]. Suppose D and D' 
are  sets  of normal defaults  with D'~  D.  Let E' be  an extension for the normal 
default theory 8' = (F,D') and let 8 = (F,D). Then 8 has an extension E  such that 
(1)  E' _c E  and 
(2)  GD(E', ~5") c_ GD(E,8). 
Appendix B: Proofs 1) 
COROLLARY 3.2 
(i)  Every argument has only a  finite number of subarguments. 
(ii)  If A is an argument explaining ~ but not minimally, then A has a subargument 
minimally explaining 0. 
Proof of (i) 
Every argument has  a  finite number of defaults  and every argument of a 
given default theory (F,~i) contains F.  El 
Proof of (ii) 
Observe first that for no D' ~  D  (F,D') has more than one extension, since 
otherwise by semimonotonicity (proposition A.6) also (F,D) would have more than 
one extension and not be an argument. Furthermore, since D  is finite, there is a 
smallest subset D' ~  D such that E(F,D') contains r  If (F,D') is not an argument, 
then for some d ~D' its consequent is not in E(F,D'); but then d is not among the 
generating defaults  of E(F,D'),  for  which reason  by  proposition  A.4  it  can  be 
deleted from D" without affecting the content of E(F,D'). If this is repeated for all 
inapplicable elements of D',  this  results  in  a  set  D"~  D'  with  only  applicable 
defaults and such that E(F,D") =  E(D,F'), for which reason (F,D") is an argument 
explaining ~b.  D 
COROLLARY 3.8 
For any set R-PA it holds that its elements do not interfere with each other. 
Proof 
By  definition  3.4  every  pair  of  arguments  A1, A2  interfering  with each 
other explain contradictory formulas ~ and --, ~, respectively. Then by corollary 3.2 
there is  a  subargument  AI'  of  A1  minimally explaining  r  and  a  subargument 
A2'of  A2  minimally explaining  --,~b. Then  by clause (2)  of definition  3.7  and 
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asymmetry of  R  at  most  one  of  AY,A2'  R-defeats  the  other,  for  which 
reason  for any set  R-PA at most one AI',A2'  and therefore of A1,A2 can be in 
R-PA.  [] 
PROPOSITION 3.9 
For all R  there is a smallest set R-PA satisfying (1)  and (2). 
Proof 
Below the fact that the notions "minimal interference" and "defeat" are relative 
to  formulas  will  for ease  of notation  be  left  implicit.  Now  consider  the  set 
PA = nn= 1 PAi.  which is the intersection of all sets PAi (1 < i < n) satisfying the 
conditions (1) and (2) of definition 3.7.  It will be shown that PA satisfies (1) and 
(2) as well, because of which it is by its construction the smallest set doing so. The 
proof needs the following observation. 
OBSERVATION B.1 
Since all of PAl ..... PAn satisfy corollary 3.8, by construction of PA no 
element of w['__ 1 PAi has counterarguments in PA.  [] 
I will abbreviate u n,=l PAi as uPAi. Consider any argument C' such that C ~ PA. 
I will concentrate on the smallest subargument C of C' for which this holds: such 
a  smallest subargument exists by corollary 3.2.  Then all subarguments of C  are, 
since they are in PA, by construction of PA also in all of PAl .....  PAn. Now the 
proof has  to  distinguish two kinds of arguments not being in PA,  depending on 
whether they are or are not in uPAi. 
Assume first that C ~ uPAi and assume that C has no counterarguments in 
uPAi: then it interferes with no element of uPAi. But since all its  subarguments 
are in all of PAl .....  PAn, C is by definition 3.7 also in all of PAl .....  PAn, for 
which reason it is by construction of PA in PA. But this contradicts the assumption 
that it is not. Therefore C has a counterargument D in uPAi defeating C, and since 
by observation B.1  the  argument D  has no  counterarguments in PA,  D  does not 
interfere with any number of PA. But then, since C does not defeat D, PA satisfies 
(2) of definition 3.7  in not containing C. 
The  second kind  of argument which is  not in  PA  is  members of uPAi. 
Consider any such argument A ~ uPAi: it will be shown that PA satisfies (1) and 
(2) in not containing A. Two cases have to be considered. The first is that some 
subargument A' of A is not in PA. Then PA satisfies (1) in not containing A. The 
second situation is that all subarguments of A  are in PA. Then there are sets PAi 
and  PAj  (1  < i,j < n)  such  that  A ~PAi  but  A ~PAj.  Then  PAj  contains  a 
counterargument B  of  A  defeating  A, otherwise by the construction of PA and 
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violates (2)  in not containing A.  But then, since by observation B.1,  B  does not 
interfere with any member of PA, PA satisfies (2) in not containing A. 
In conclusion, PA satisfies definition 3.7 in not containing A.  [] 
PROPOSITION 4.9 
S-defeat is asymmetric. 
The proof needs the following lemma. 
LEMMA B.2 
For all  arguments A  and A" and formulas ~  such that A  and A' minimally 
interfere with respect to r  there is  a  formula ~  such that A  and A' conflict with 
respect to ~. 
Proof of lemma B.2 
Let A1 = (F, D1)  and A2 -- (F, D2)  such that A1  and A2 minimally explain d~ and 
--,t~,  respectively.  Then by  finiteness of an  argument there  exists  a  minimal t~- 
implying set A1  * such that  F u  CONS(A1  *) w CONS(D2) is inconsistent; likewise 
there exists  a --,0-implying set A2  ''* such that F u  CONS(A2  -'*) u  CONS(D1)  is 
inconsistent. If neither ~  nor --,~  is  a  conjunction of a  final and an  intermediate 
conclusion, then A1 and A2 conflict with respect to ~ and we are done. If otherwise, 
then  assume without loss of generality that it is otherwise for A1, that is, that t~ 
is  deductively implied by a  final conclusion ~  and an intermediate conclusion 
of A1, but not by ~  alone. Then, there is a v-implying set A1  v such that A1  v c  A1  ~' 
and F u  CONS(A1  v) u  CONS(D2) is inconsistent. Now if A1 and A2 also minimally 
interfere with respect to  ~,  then this contradicts the assumed minimality of A1  *. 
Therefore A1 and A2 do not minimally interfere with respect to ~, for which reason 
they conflict with respect to ~.  [] 
Proof of proposition 4.9 
By corollary 3.2 for every pair of arguments (Ai, Aj) interfering with each 
other there is a pair of subarguments (Ai', Aj') minimally interfering with each other 
with  respect  to  some formula ~. Then by lemma B.2 for some formula ~  Ai'  and 
Aj'  conflict  with  each  other.  Furthermore,  the  relation "s.m.s.," of definition 4.4 
is obviously asymmetric, and since this relation must by definition 4.7 hold for all 
formulas ~ with respect to which arguments conflict in order to have a  relation of 
S-defeat between Ai' and Aj', S-defeat is an asymmetric relation as well.  [] 
THEOREM 4.10 
For every normal default theory (F,8),  DK(F,8,S)  is deductively closed. 122  H. Prakken, An argumentation framework in default logic 
Proof 
Note that the proof is relative to a fixed (F,~): hence all Di occurring below 
are sets of ground instances of elements of 5. First a pair of S-preferred arguments 
is considered, Ai = (F, Di) and Aj = (F, Dj). It will be proven that if these S-preferred 
arguments are combined, the result is also an S-preferred argument. According to 
definition 3.7 this boils down to proving the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION B.3 
For every Ai = (F, Di) and Aj = (F, Dj): ifAi and Aj are S-preferred arguments, 
then 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Ai u  Aj is  an argument; 
All subarguments of Ai u  Aj  are S-preferred; 
For all formulas ~ and arguments Ak such that Ai u  Aj minimally interferes 
with Ak with respect to ~b and neither Ak nor one of its subarguments is S- 
defeated by another S-preferred argument: Ai u  Aj S-defeats Ak. 
Proof of proposition  B.3, (i) 
This  clause is  proven by the  following lemma and the fact that preferred 
arguments do not interfere with each other. The lemma says that the combination 
of two non-interfering arguments is again an argument. 
LEMMA B.4 
If Ai and Aj are non-interfering arguments (el. def. 3.4), then Ai u  Aj is an 
argument. 
Proof of lemma B.4 
By proposition A.5 Ai u  Aj has a unique extension if F u  CONS(Di u  Dj) 
is consistent. Furthermore, since all defaults of an argument are by definition 3.1 
applicable, for any argument A -  (F,D) it holds that GD(A) = D, for which reason 
by  proposition  A.4  the  extension  E(A) = Th(F u  CONS(D)).  By  assumption 
E(Ai) u  E(Aj) is consistent, which means that Th(F u  CONS(Di)) u  Th(F u  CONS(Dj)) 
is consistent. Then also Th(F u  CONS(Di) O CONS(Dj)) = Th(F u  CONS(Di t..) Dj)) 
is  consistent.  But this  is equal to E(Ai u  Aj), which because of proposition A.5 
proves that Ai uAj  has a unique extension. Furthermore, since Ai u  Aj contains 
only defaults of Ai and Aj, which are arguments, all defaults of Ai u  Aj are applicable. 
Hence Ai u  Aj is an argument.  [] 
The proof of proposition B.3, (i) now immediately follows from lemma B.4 and proposition 
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COROLLARY B.5 
If Ai is a preferred argument and Aj a not defeated argument then Ai u  Aj 
is an argument. 
Proof of corollary B.5 
Ai and Aj are not interfering with each other, since otherwise Aj would be 
defeated. Then by lemma B.4 Ai u  Aj is an argument.  [] 
The clauses (ii) and Off) of proposition B.3 are proven with induction on the 
definition of a  preferred argument.  Informally, the initial step takes  care of the 
smallest subargument of Ai u  Aj, which is  (F, { }).  Every inductive step consists 
of adding one more default either to the subargument of Ai created so far, or to the 
subargument of Aj created so far, and this in every possible order. The choice which 
default to  add  next is  restricted  by the  requirement of definition 3.1  that  every 
default of an  argument is  applicable:  only  defaults  can  be  added  of which the 
prerequisite is explained by the argument to which it is  added. 
Proof of proposition B.3, (ii,iii) 
Initial step:  If Di' = Dj' = the  empty  set,  then  Ai u  Aj = F  is  trivially preferred 
because, since F  is assumed consistent, there are no interfering arguments. 
Notation B.6:  For any argument A = (F,D), A-1  is a maximal subargument of A, 
which means that it is a subargument of A obtained by deleting one element of D. 
Induction hypothesis:  For every Ai' = (F, Di') and Aj" = (F, Dj') such that Di' c_ Di 
and Dj' ~  Dj, and for every Aj'-I "Ai' u  Aj'-I  is a preferred argument. 
Induction step:  Consider an arbitrary pair of preferred arguments A1 = (F, D1) and 
A2 = (F, D2)  such that D1 ~  Di  and D2 ~  Dj. Then by the induction hypothesis 
both A1 u  A2-1  and AI-1 u  A2 are preferred. What is left to prove is that for all 
formulas ~ and arguments A3 such that A 1 u  A2 and A3 minimally interfere with 
respect to ~, A3 is defeated, since then A1 u  A2 is a preferred argument. First the 
following lemma is needed. 
LEMMA B.7 
IfA = (F,D) and ~  = (F,D') are non-interfering arguments and A u  A' minimally 
explains t~, then there is a formula p, minimally explained by A, and a formula p', 
minimally explained by A', such that  {p,p'}  ~ ~  and neither p ~,  nor p' ~. 
Proof 
Consider a (A u  A')  ~'. It contains elements of both D and D', since otherwise 
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of D and D', respectively, which are in (A to A')*. Then F to {q,p' } ~ r  By compactness 
of  first-order predicate  logic  the  same holds for a minimal finite subset F' of F. 
Let f  be the  conjunction  of  all  elements  of  F'  and  let  p  be  (q ^  f).  Then A 
explains  p  and  {p,p' } ~ ,.  Furthermore,  A  and  A' minimally explain  p  and  p', 
because if a  subargument Ai of, say,  A  would explain p, then there would be  a 
subargument of A u  A'  explaining ~, viz. Ai to A'.  [] 
Now  a  crucial  step in  the proof of proposition B.3  is the  following. By 
lemma B.7 the arguments A1  and A2 minimally explain formulas pl  and p2 such 
that  {pl,p2} ~ ~.  But then {~r  } ~ ~p2  and  {~O, p2} ~ --,pl. Hence if there 
is an argument A3 for ~r  then A1 u  A3 interferes with A2 and A2 u  A3 interferes 
with  A1.  What  will  be  shown  is  that  the  existence  of such  an  A3  leads  to  a 
contradiction if A3 is not S-defeated by another preferred argument. 
ASSUMPTION B.8 (for contradiction) 
Forsome formula 0  minimally explained by A1 u  A2 there is an argument 
A3  minimally interfering  with  A1 u  A2  with  respect to  ~  and  not defeated  by 
another preferred argument. 
Two situations must be considered: first the one in which not both A1 to A3 and 
A2 u  A3 are an argument and then the situation in which they both are an argument. 
The first situation causes no problems. 
FACT B.9 
If A1 to A3 or A2 to A3 is not an argument, then A3 is defeated by A1 or A2. 
Proof 
If A1 to A3 or A2 u  A3 is not an argument, then by corollary B.5  A1  and 
A3 or A2 and A3 interfere; but then by corollary 3.2 these arguments also minimally 
interfere with respect to some formula, for which reason by definition 3.10 A3 is 
already defeated by A1  or A2 individually.  [] 
The second situation which has to be considered is that both A1 u  A3 and A2 u  A3 
are an argument. Now an important observation is that since both A1  and A2 are 
preferred, both A1 tj A3 and A2 u  A3 are defeated. It is this observation which will 
make it possible to derive a contradicting refuting assumption B.8. To summarize, 
the situation is as follows. 
SITUATION 1 
For some argument A3 and formula r  there are formulas pl and p2 such that 
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A1  minimally explains pl  and is a  preferred argument; 
A2 minimally explains p2 and is a  preferred argument; 
A3 minimally explains --,~; 
A2 u  A3 explains ~pl  and is a  defeated argument; 
A1 u  A3 explains --,p2  and is a  defeated argument. 
The  rest  of the proof will  be  devoted to  showing that  this  situation  leads  to  a 
contradiction refuting assumption B.8. First I shall show that A2 u  A3 and A1 w A3 
have no defeated subarguments. Assume for contradiction that this  is  otherwise. 
Then three situations have to be considered, which will without loss of generality 
be done for A2 w A3. 
Note first that if A2 u  A3 = A2 then this contradicts the assumption that A2 
is  a  preferred argument. Otherwise if A2 u  A3 = A3 then A3  is defeated by A1, 
contrary to assumption B.8. 
Consider next the situation that there is a  subargument A2' of A2 such that 
A2' u  A3  is  defeated. Then by the same line of reasoning as  the one leading to 
situation 1 it holds that A3 interferes with A1 w A2', but this argument is preferred 
by the induction hypothesis, for which reason A3 is defeated by another preferred 
argument, which contradicts assumption B.8  that it is not. 
Let there finally be a subargument A3' of A3 such that A2 w A3' is defeated. 
Then A1 u  A2 interferes with A3', which contradicts the assumption B.8 that A3 
is minimal in interfering with A1 u  A2. In conclusion, A2 u  A3 contains no defeated 
subarguments. 
Observe now that, since clause (2) of definition 3.7 leaves room for reinstatement 
(cf.  example  5.2),  A1  need not itself defeat  A2 w A3  in  order  to  be  preferred. 
Therefore I will now derive from situation 1 the basic situation which justifies the 
qualifications  "preferred"  and  "defeated"  in  situation  1.  Let  A4  be  a  preferred 
argument which is possibly distinct from A 1 and which S-defeats A2 u  A3. Then 
for all formulas r  with respect to which A2 u  A3 conflicts with A4 it holds that 
A4 s.m.s.r A2 w A3. Since A2 w A3 minimally explains ~r  there is by lemma B.7 
a formula ~, minimally explained by A2, and a formula a, minimally explained by 
A3, such that  {~,oQ I=~.  Then  {~,~} ~  ~  but neither ~  ~t~, nor r  ~  ~, 
since by assumption B.8 that A3 is not defeated by a preferred argument other than 
A1 u  A2, A3 does not interfere with A4 or A2, which are both preferred. Furthermore, 
by lemma B.2 there is a  formula ~  with respect to which A3 not only minimally 
interferes but also conflicts with A4 u  A2 and for which further the same holds as 
for  t~.  Observe  finally  that  all  this  also  holds  for  an  argument A5  S-defeating 
A1 u  A3  with respect to ~  and thereby reinstating A2. 
Now  the  idea  is  to  establish  direct  relations  of defeat  in  situation  1  by 
replacing  A1  by  A4  and  A2 by A5. However, it  should then first be shown that 
A4 s.m.s., A5 u  A3.  Consider  therefore  an  even  more  specific  argument  A6 
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A2 u  A3, for which reason we can make A4 equal to A6.  Since the same line of 
reasoning holds for A5 explaining ~  we can, in sum, say that A5 u  A3 is S-defeated 
with respect to ~ by A4 and A4 u  A3 is S-defeated with respect to V by A5. But 
then we  can  concentrate  on  the  following situation.  Note  that  it  is  structurally 
similar to situation 1, apart from the difference that all defeated arguments in the 
situation are directly defeated by other arguments in the situation. 
FACT B.10 
There are arguments A4, A5 and formulas ~, V, and g  such that 
-A4  minimally explains ~ and is a preferred argument such that A4 and 
A5 u A3 conflict  with rcspcct  to ~ and A4 s.m.s.#  A5 u A3; 
-A5  minimally explains V  and is a preferred  argumcnt such that  A5 and 
A4 
-  A3 
-  A5 
-  A4 
u  A3 conflict with respect to V  and A5 s.m.s.# A4 uA3; 
minimally explains Z; 
u  A3 minimally explains --,~  and is a defeated argument; 
u  A3 minimally explains ",V and is a  defeated argument. 
REMARK  B.1I 
Because of the various relations of interference none of ~, V  and ~( and their 
negations is entailed by the set F  of facts.  Below this will be left implicit. 
Recall that the situation of fact B. 10 has been constructed as the basic case justifying 
all relations of defeat in situation  1, which situation was the result of assumption 
B.8 for contradiction. Now, if an inconsistency can be derived from this situation, 
assumption B.8 has been refuted. In this derivation the next lemma is a key element. 
LEMMA B.12 
IfA = (F,D) andA' = (F,D') minimally explain r  and ~b', {~b,~' } ~ V and A u  A' 
minimally explains V, then every possible fact Fp makes A u  A' explain V iff Fp 
makes A  explain r  and A' explain r 
Proof 
Trivial. 
=~ ￿9 Since A uA' minimally explains V, it needs all defaults of D  and D' to 
explain V. Therefore it explains both t~ and ~b', and therefore for some v-implying 
set D,' = (A u  A')  ~ there is a A  s c_ D" and a A  '~'  _c D". Furthermore, by definition 
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reason D" is also a y-implying set of (Fn u  {Fp} ,D u  D'). Then Fp also makes A 
explain ~  and A' explain ~'.  [] 
We are now in the position to derive from fact B.10 a contradiction refuting assumption 
B.8.  Note  that  all  conditions of minimal explanation  and of conflict which are 
implicitly assumed below are satisfied by fact B.10. 
(1)  since  A3 u  A4  explains  --,~  and  A5  S-defeats  A3 u  A4  it  holds  that 
A5 s.m.s.v A3 u  A4; the same holds for A4 and A3 u  A5 with respect to ~. 
(2)  Every possible fact making A4 explain $, makes A3 u  A5 explain --,$ (fact 
B.lo). 
(3)  Every  possible  fact  making A4  explain ~,  makes  A3  explain Z  and  A5 
explain ~/(lemma B.12,2). 
(4)  Every  possible  fact  making  A4  explain  4) and  A3  explain  Z,  makes A5 
explain ~  (4). 
(5)  Every possible fact making A3 u  A4 explain -~,  makes A5 explain ~  (5, 
lemma B.12 ). 
(5) contradicts (1), which says that A5 s.m.s.~ A4 u  A3. The only assumption for 
contradiction which can be retracted to restore consistency is assumption B.8, which 
says that there is a counterargument A3 against A1 u  A2. Together with fact B.9 this 
proves (ii) and (iii) of proposition B.3.  [] (end of proof of proposition B.3,(ii, iii)). 
COROLLARY B.13 
If two formulas $  and $'  are in DK, and  {$,$'}  I  = r  then (x is in DK. 
Proof 
By  definition  3.13  a  formula is  in DK  iff it  has  a  preferred  argument. 
Assume ~ has a preferred argument A and ~' has a preferred argument A'. Now, by 
proposition B.3  and definition 3.7  A u  A" is  preferred and by definition 3.13  o~, 
which is explained by A u  A', is in DK.  12] 
Now the proof of the deductive closure of DK(F,8,S) (theorem 4.10) can be 
completed. According to the compactness theorem for first-order predicate logic, if 
a formula is implied by an infinite DK, it is implied by a finite subset of DK. For 
this reason it suffices to show for any finite subset f~ of DK: if t3 ~ ~, then ~ ~ DK. 
This is proven by induction on the number (n) of elements of t3. 
Initial step:  If n < 2,  then if n = 0, then ~ ~  and ~ e DK by the definition of an 
argument, otherwise r  ~DK by corollary B.13  (for n =  1 let r  be ~). 
Induction  hypothesis:  If fl  is  a  finite  subset  of ~  with n  elements, then for all 
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Induction step:  Assume f~ =  {al .....  on} is a finite subset of DK and t2 ~ r  Then 
by the deduction theorem for first-order logic {  al .....  an _ ~  } ~ (an D r  and by 
the  induction hypothesis  (on D r  DK.  Since  by  assumption also  an ~ DK,  by 
corollary B.13 r  ~DK.  [] (end of proof of theorem 4.10). 
THEOREM  4.11 
For every normal default theory (F,~5), DK(F, 8, S) is the unique extension of 
(F, Dpref). 
Proof 
It must be shown that DK is the smallest set satisfying the following properties 
(definition A.3): 
(i)  F  __ DK 
(ii)  Th(DK) = DK 
(iii)  If a: 13/13 E D pref and a  ~ DK,  and ~ 13 not ~ DK, then 13 ~ DK. 
Proof of (i) 
Since by definition 3. IF is explained by every argument, it is also explained 
by every preferred argument, for which reason all elements of F  are in DK. 
Proof of (ii) 
This is theorem 4.10. 
Proof of (iii) 
a  ::~ 13 ~ D pref iff a  =~ 13  is  in  some preferred  argument S.  Then,  since  a 
preferred  argument is  an  argument,  both  a  and  13  are  explained  by  A  and  by 
definition of DK both a  and 13 are in DK. 
To prove the minimality of DK, assume there is a  DK' c  DK satisfying the 
above three properties. Then there is a formula r  ~ DK for which there is a preferred 
argument A = (Fi,Di), but which formula is not in DK'. Assume that of all defaults 
a  =~ 13 of Di a  is in DK'. Then, if all 13 are in DK' as well, because of (ii), clause 
(b) of definition 3.1  and the fact that F u  CONS(Di) ~ r  also r  is in DK', which 
contradicts our assumption. But if some 13 is not in DK', condition (iii) is violated. 
Therefore, of one element of Di  the prerequisite  a  is  not in  DK'.  Consider the 
smallest subargument A' of A such that of some of its defaults the prerequisite is 
not in DK'. Then there is a subargument A" of A' such that CONS(A') u  F ~ PRE(A'), 
since otherwise some defaults of Di are not applicable. Since by condition (iii) all 
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condition (ii) also all elements of PRE(A') are in DK', which contradicts the observation 
that at least one of them is not and thereby the assumption that DK' c  DK.  [] 
FACT 4.13 
If an argument A  minimally explains a  formula ~  then [r  is unique. 
Proof 
Assume A has two distinct [t~]A, T1 and T2. Then (F,D-T1) is a subargument 
of A  explaining ~, which contradicts the minimality of A.  [] 
PROPOSITION 4.15 
H-defeat is  asymmetric. 
Proof 
Trivial  from  the  observation  that  the  >~-relation  between  arguments  is 
asymmetric.  [] 
THEOREM 4.16 
For every normal default theory (F,~),  DK(F,~,H)  is deductively closed. 
Proof 
The proof is largely similar to that of theorem 4.10.  Below the differences 
will be  discussed. Up to  and  including "situation  1" both proofs  are  completely 
similar. Then by a  similar line of reasoning as from situation  1 above a  situation 
can be obtained in which A1 u  A3 and A2 u  A3 are directly H-defeated by another 
argument in the situation. 
FACT B.14 
There are arguments A4, A5  and formulas r  ~, X such that 
A4 minimally explains ~ and  is  a  preferred  argument such that A4  >, A5 u  A3; 
A5 minimally explains V and is  a preferred argument such that A5  >v A4 u  A3; 
A3 minimally explains Z; 
A5 u  A3 minimally explains ~r  and is  a  defeated argument; 
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Now  again  the  aim  is  to  derive  from  this  situation  a  contradiction  refuting 
assumption B.8. For this derivation the following lemmas are needed. 
LEMMA B.15 
IrA = (F,D) minimally explains ~), A' = (F,D') minimally explains (I)', {~,~' } t  = 
and A u  A' is an argument minimally explaining ~, then [~](A u  A') _c [~)]A to [~)']A'. 
Proof 
Consider  any  d ~[~](A to A').  Then  for  all  d' ~D to D'  it  holds  that 
(F,(D to D')-{d})  explains  PRE(d').  Consider for any such d'  a  minimal subset 
D'" c  (D to D' )- {d}  such that (F,D") explains PRE(d') (since by compactness of 
first-order logic there is a finite set for which this holds, there is also such a minimal 
subset).  Now observe that by definition 3.1(a)  all defaults  of both  A  and A' are 
applicable,  for which reason no element of D  needs  an element of D'-D  to  be 
applicable and vice versa. Then, since d' ~ D or d' ~ D', and since d' is applicable, 
it holds that for at least one D" mentioned above D" ~  D or D" c_ D'. Furthermore, 
since d (~ D" also D" ~  D- {d} or D" c_ D'-- {d}. Then since (F,D") explains PRE(d') 
and  normal  default  logic  is  semimonotonic  (proposition  A.6)  an  extension of 
(F,D- {d}) or one of (F,D'-- {d}) contains PRE(d'); and since these default theories 
have a unique extension since they are subarguments of the argument A u  A', we 
can say  that (F,D-{d})  or (F,D'-{d})  explains PRE(d');  but then by definition 
4.12 of a top rule d E [(I)]A or d ~ [(~']A'. Hence [~](A to A') c_ [~]A to [~)']A'.  [] 
LEMMA B.16 
Let A = (F,D) minimally explain ~, A' = (F,D') minimally explains ~', and 
{~,~' } ~ ~. If [~](A to A') does not contain elements of [O]A, then A is a subargument 
of A'. 
Proof 
Assume that no element of [~]A is a top default of A u  A', that is, for every 
d ~[~)]A  there is  a  d'~D'  such that  (F, DuD'-{d})  does  not explain PRE(d'). 
Then, since by definition of an argument d' is applicable, d  is needed to make d' 
applicable in A', for which reason d  is in D'. But then also all d"~ D  which are 
needed to make d applicable in A are in D'; if not, then for some such d" (F, D to D' - 
{d" }) would be a  subargument of A to A'  explaining ~. Finally, since this holds 
for all d ~ [4)]A and since D contains by minimality of A no defaults irrelevant for 
the explanation of ~, every d ~ D  is in D'.  13 
We are now again in the position to derive a contradiction refuting assumption 
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A4 u  A3, some "relevant" defaults of A4 and A5 are higher than each other, which 
is  a  contradiction. Observe first that, because of the relations of defeat stated in 
fact B.14,  according to the definition of being higher D3,  D4 and D5  are totally 
ordered. Furthermore, 
(1)  Since  A4 >~ A5 u  A3  (fact B.14),  it  holds  that  [O]A4 > [~O](A5 u  A3) 
(definition 4.14); For the same reasons, since A5 >v A4 u  A3, it holds that 
[~F]A5 >  [~v](A4 u  A3). 
(2)  [~O](A5 u  A3) ~  [~]A5 u  [x]A3  and  [~v](A4 u  A3) c  [O]A4 u  [x]A3 
(fact B.14, lemma B.15). 
(3)  [~r  u  A3) ~  Ix]A3, since otherwise by lemma B.16 A5 is a subargument 
of A3 and A3 is defeated by A4, contrary to assumption B.8. Then because 
of (2), [--,r  u  A3) contains elements of [~]A5. These remarks also hold 
for [O]A4  and  [~v](A4 u  A3). 
(4)  There is a d l  ~ [~F]A5 such that d 1 ~ [~ r  u  A3) (3) and for all d' ~ [r  A4 
dl < d'  (1,  definition  4.14);  likewise  is  there  a  d2 ~[r  such  that 
d2 ~ [~v](A4 u  A3)  and for all d' ~ [~]A5  d2 < d'. 
(5)  Both dl < d2 and d2 < dl  (4),  which is a  contradiction. 
(6)  The only assumption which can be retracted to restore consistency is assumption 
B.8, saying that there is a counterargument A3 of A1 u  A2 not defeated by 
another preferred argument. The proof of theorem 4.16 is then completed in 
the same way as for theorem 4.10.  [] (end of proof of theorem 4.16). 
Finally, the proof of theorem 4.17 for H-defeat is identical to the proof of theorem 
4.11  for S-defeat. 
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